Delegation of Environmental Impact Statement Preparation: A Critique of NEPA’s Enforcement by Frank, Robert P
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 4
9-1-1985
Delegation of Environmental Impact Statement
Preparation: A Critique of NEPA’s Enforcement
Robert P. Frank
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert P. Frank, Delegation of Environmental Impact Statement Preparation: A Critique of NEPA’s
Enforcement, 13 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 79 (1985), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol13/
iss1/4
DELEGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT PREPARATION: A CRITIQUE OF 
NEPA'S ENFORCEMENT 
Robert P. Frank* 
Delegation without standards short-circuits the lines of responsibility 
that make the political process meaningful. 1 
Alexander Bickel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires 
that the federal government file an environmental impact statement 
(EIS) whenever it takes an action "significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment."2 Designed to ensure that the federal 
government consider the environmental effect of proposed actions, 
the environmental impact statement is the central procedural re-
quirement of NEP A. When the statute became law, however, it did 
not specify whether or not the federal agency filing the EIS could 
delegate the job of preparing the statement to a state or a private 
party. After five years of litigation had left the federal circuits 
divided, Congress amended NEPA in 1975 to allow EIS delegation 
to the states as long as an independent federal evaluation of the 
statement followed. 3 Congress did not, however, state how a federal 
agency - or a court confronting a challenge to the delegation -
could ensure that evaluation of the statement was adequate and the 
statement objectively prepared. 
* Executive Editor, 1985-1986, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 Fine, Rethinking the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 B. U.L. REV. 257,257 (1982). 
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
3 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1982). 
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Because NEP A is a statute that seeks to ensure that the federal 
government consider the environmental impact of its actions before 
taking them, the problem delegation presents is crucial to the stat-
ute's enforcement., An EIS prepared by a state or a private party 
directs federal consideration of environmental impact to two activi-
ties: offering guidance on the statement as it is being prepared and 
evaluating the statement once it is prepared. 
Before 1975, courts could prevent the complete delegation of the 
EIS and require instead that the federal agency filing the statement 
prepare it in final form. Congress' amendment to NEP A denied 
courts this opportunity by allowing complete delegation of EIS prep-
aration. But the amendment has not resolved debate over EIS del-
egation. Uncertainty over the degree to which NEPA allows dele-
gation remains. Yet its focus has now changed to one that centers 
on how to decide when the statute's requirements for delegation 
have been met. This article explores that debate, beginning with an 
examination of NEPA and its treatment before 1975, progressing to 
the current judicial attitude toward the amended NEPA, and con-
cluding with suggestions on how to resolve the current impasse 
NEPA has reached. 
II. THE GENESIS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
When S. 1075,4 the bill that would become the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),5 was first introduced in February 
of that year by Senator Henry Jackson, 6 it contained neither a dec-
laration of national environmental policy nor a requirement for an 
environmental impact statement (EIS).7 Both provisions resulted 
from the testimony of University of Indiana political science profes-
sor Dr. Lynton K. Caldwell before Senator Jackson's Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs.8 Congress needed to realize, Caldwell 
urged, that a meaningful national environmental policy "is not 
merely a statement of things hoped for . . . but a statement that 
4 R. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE: IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 8 (1976). 
5 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1982). 
6 R. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 8. 
7 F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY ACT 5 (1973). Anderson also notes here that Senator Jackson omitted any 
declaration of national policy in S. 1075 despite earlier efforts "to enlist congressional support 
for such a policy." Id. 
sId. at 6. 
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will compel or reinforce"9 a desired objective. Caldwell proposed 
that federal agencies be required to evaluate the effect of their 
actions on the environment. 1o This evaluation eventually became 
known as the environmental impact statement. 
Requiring an EIS for every federal action affecting the environ-
ment provided the action-forcing measure Caldwell saw as the center 
of any national environmental policy: it made concern for the envi-
ronment a factor in federal decisions and forced federal agencies to 
act accordingly. Thus, NEP A's declaration of a national environmen-
tal policy is inextricably linked to the EIS requirement. The union 
has proved to be a fruitful one: the EIS requirement in NEPA 
generated "more cases than any other single environmental statute 
in the 1970s."11 
Although Caldwell had outlined the idea of the environmental 
impact statement, its appearance awaited the completion of a legis-
lative process that enabled Congress to address the consequences of 
a national environmental policy. The fruit of this process, NEPA 
represented a departure from the traditional statutory approach to 
environmental protection because the statute did not seek, as pre-
vious ones had, to impose responsibiiities on parts of the private 
sector. 12 Instead, NEPA imposed responsibilities on the federal gov-
ernment itself, recognizing government as a cause of environmental 
damage and mandating that future government action consider en-
vironmental concerns. 13 This approach not only risked exposing the 
federal government to unforeseen liabilities, but also raised the ques-
tion of how to require the federal government to weigh the environ-
mental impact of every action it took. 
At the same hearing in which the need for an action-forcing pro-
vision was first raised, Senator Jackson and Dr. Caldwell discussed 
just how the responsibilities NEP A sought to codify could be im-
posed on the federal government. Senator Jackson saw two possible 
approaches: the statute could "lay down a general requirement that 
would be applicable to all agencies that have responsibilities that 
affect the environment"14 or it could try an "agency by agency" 
approach.15 This second approach would have achieved the aims of 
9 R. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 177. 
10 [d. 
11 LE'ITIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT 11 (1982). 
12 [d. at 10. 
13 [d. 
14 F. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 6. 
15 [d. 
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NEP A by spreading the responsibilities throughout the federal bu-
reaucracy, amending the statutes empowering each federal agency 
to act. NEP A would thus have become a series of amendments to 
existing laws rather than a wholly new, independent statute. Faced 
with the prospect of abandoning his initial efforts and proposing 
instead numerous and intricate amendments to existing federal laws, 
Senator Jackson decided that he wanted to avoid a recodification of 
all the statutes. 16 
Rejecting recodification, Senator Jackson sought a general re-
quirement applicable throughout the federal government and 
amended S. 1075 in May, 1969 to require a "finding" by the respon-
sible federal official concerning the probable environmental impacts 
of any major federal action. 17 The "finding" Senator Jackson proposed 
did not require - as the E IS requirement eventually would - a 
detailed statement of the environmental impact a federal action 
might have. 18 Nor did the finding proposal require consultation 
among the various federal agencies involved in an action - another 
requirement the EIS would impose. 19 Yet, despite containing re-
quirements significantly less stringent than those NEPA would even-
tually possess, Senator Jackson's finding proposal initially confronted 
amendments designed to frustrate, not strengthen, its intent. 
When S. 1075 went to the House, Representative Wayne Aspinall 
successfully sought to amend the action-forcing provision which was 
Senator Jackson's finding. requirement. 20 Representative Aspinall's 
amendment was a single sentence: "[N]othing in this Act shall in-
crease, decrease, or change any responsibility or authority of any 
federal official or agency created by other provision of law. "21 This 
sort of dentistry left Senator Jackson's bill toothless. In one sen-
tence, Representative Aspinall had erased the action-forcing provi-
sion Senator Jackson sought, and ensured instead that the proposed 
NEPA could not force the federal government to do anything it was 
not already required to do. The Representative fundamentally dis-
agreed with the Senator's rejection of recodification and stated 
bluntly that "if additional authority is needed and direction to exist-
ing agencies is needed, they should be provided by separate legis-
lation. "22 
16 R. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 9. 
17Id. 
18Id. 
19Id. 
20 Id. at 11-12. 
21 Id. at 11. 
22Id. 
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The House adopted Representative Aspinall's amendment, and 
returned to the Senate a radically different S. 1075, along with a 
request that there be a conference to resolve the differences between 
what the Senate had submitted and what the House had returned. 23 
On October 8, 1969, shortly after introducing the House's conference 
request to the Senate, Senator Jackson introduced an amendment 
to S. 1075.24 The amendment Senator Jackson had proposed to the 
Senate diluted the legal force of the required finding "by requiring 
only a 'detailed statement' subject to interagency review rather than 
a formal 'finding"'25 that could have given potential litigants a chance 
to question an agency's environmental determinations through resort 
to the Administrative Procedure Act. 26 However, Senator Jackson's 
change inadvertently strengthened NEPA's action-forcing provi-
sions by "substituting mechanisms for external review and challenge 
in place of the administrative requirements that had been crippled 
by the Aspinall amendment. "27 
Senator Jackson's amendment was not, however, a response to 
the amendments S. 1075 had undergone in the House. Senator Jack-
son's amendment to S. 1075 had been written while the bill was in 
the House. It represented a compromise between Senators Jackson 
and Muskie over the jurisdiction of different committees they 
chaired.28 Under Senator Jackson's amendment, certain federal con-
23 [d. at 12. 
24 [d. 
25 [d. at 13 (emphasis in original). 
26 Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1982). NEPA did not free 
government officials of the constraints of the Administrative Procedure Act, but its provisions 
for notice and comment did mean that the statute would involve federal agency decisions 
beyond those of the filing agency. Because several decisions were made simultaneously by 
various agencies, the standard of review was somewhat lower than that provided for by the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
While the level" and scope of this review is a question each court is free to decide, NEPA 
is at least specific in requiring, at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), all federal officials responsible for 
the EIS to "consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction 
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved." See National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); II GRAD, TREATISE 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 8.03[3][c]. 
27 R. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 13 (emphasis in original). 
28 Senator Muskie's Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, part of the Senate Committee 
on Public Works, and Senator Jackson's Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs disagreed 
about which committee would exercise jurisdiction over air and water standards. Senator 
Muskie received Senator Jackson's assurance that air and water standards set by his committee 
would not be affected by Senator Jackson's work on NEPA. Initially, this concession raised 
the question of whether or not environmental protection agencies themselves were required 
to prepare the EIS. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
While this compromise has not directly affected EIS preparation, it nevertheless influenced 
EIS delegation. Once air and water standards were excluded from consideration under NEPA, 
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siderations of water and air quality were exempted from NEP A,29 
and the finding requirement became a requirement for a "detailed 
statement" of the environmental effects of the proposed federal ac-
tion. 30 Popularly referred to as an environmental impact statement, 
Senator Jackson's "detailed statement" requirement was adopted 
when the House and Senate passed NEPA in December, 1969.31 
President Nixon signed the bill into law on January 1, 1970.32 
This article explores the question of how courts may decide 
whether a federal agency has actually made the federal evaluation 
of environmental impact NEPA requires, after having delegated the 
job of EIS preparation to a state or private party. NEP A as passed 
by Congress did not even address this question; in fact, it was 
initially unclear if NEPA allowed EIS delegation at all. The first 
section of this article sets forth what NEP A now says about dele-
gation - the statute allows it; and then outlines the current regu-
lations dealing with the unbiased preparation of a delegated EIS. 
The second section shows how the early EIS delegation cases raised 
and sharpened issues NEP A had not addressed when enacted. This 
section examines how Congress responded to these cases when it 
amended NEP A in 1975 to allow delegation. It then analyzes how 
post-1975 delegation cases expanded delegation as courts attempted 
to interpret the delegation standards Congress did enact into law. 
The section concludes that the current confusion surrounding EIS 
delegation offers a textbook example of how courts struggle to rec-
oncile the necessity of deference to agency decisions with the need 
to police delegation. The article's final section notes how courts may 
make use of recent regulatory developments to improve the judicial 
evaluation of the validity of EIS delegation. 
III. NEPA AND EIS DELEGATION: THE STATUTORY CONTEXT 
Since the question of EIS delegation involves an array of statutes, 
regulations, and case law, it is necessary at the outset to specify 
what NEP A, and the regulations promulgated under it, explicitly 
say about federal evaluation of delegated statements. NEPA's dec-
highway construction became the focus of much litigation involving EIS delegation. See infra 
notes 80-81 and accompanying text. This development had a powerful political effect on the 
law of EIS delegation. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
29 R. ANDREWS, supra note 4, at 13. 
30 [d. at 12. 
31 [d. at 13. 
32 [d. 
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laration of national environmental policy is exceptionally broad. It 
provides that the federal government, working with state and local 
governments, as well as private organizations, is to "use all practic-
able means and measures, including financial and technical assis-
tance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general 
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and 
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, eco-
nomic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans. "33 The public policy expressed in NEP A is thus by no 
means specific. 
To realize this broad policy, NEPA imposes a general mandate on 
the federal government through the environmental impact statement 
requirement. The EIS requirement states that, before "major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment" may be taken, the official responsible for such an action must 
file "a detailed statement" on its environmental impact. 34 This state-
ment must discuss alternatives to the proposed action, as well as 
the impact of that action. 35 
Though the responsible federal official must file the statement, 
that official need not prepare the statement. NEP A allows federal 
agencies to delegate the job of preparing the EIS.36 Under a 1975 
amendment to NEP A, state agencies and officials may prepare an 
EIS if two conditions are met. First, the state officials preparing 
the statement must have statewide jurisdiction and authority to 
grant the federal funds that trigger the statement. 37 Second, the 
federal official filing the statement must furnish guidance during its 
preparation and independently evaluate the E IS before adopting it. 38 
Having satisfied these two conditions, the federal official faces a 
third requirement applicable to all environmental impact statements. 
Before an EIS may be filed, the federal official must "consult with 
and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental 
33 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101, 42 u.s.c. § 4331 (1982). 
34 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 u.s.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
35 Id. at (2)(C)(i), (ii), and (iii) (1982). 
36 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1982). 
37 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D)(i) 
(1982). 
38 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D)(ii) and (iii), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(D)(ii) and (iii) (1982). Though the statute lists three conditions applicable to any 
delegation of environmental impact statement preparation, there are only two listed here 
because in practice, (ii) and (iii) inevitably turn out to be different sides of the same coin. No 
court has ever sought to distinguish them, or to apply different standards to them. 
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impact involved. "39 In effect, then, federal officials must circulate a 
draft EIS for comment before filing the statement required by 
NEPA. 
Once federal officials have followed these procedures, the require-
ments set forth in NEP A are satisfied. The statutory terms of the 
EIS requirement impose no further procedures on the federal gov-
ernment. NEP A does not provide that agencies are bound by the 
environmental information they find. Nor does the statute require 
that the filing agency itself gather the information it must evaluate 
when making a decision. As enacted, NEPA was silent as to whether 
an agency could rely on information it had not gathered. The 1975 
amendment resolves this question by allowing EIS delegation to the 
states; however, it is still unclear when a federal agency's reliance 
on information it did not prepare constitutes a review sufficient to 
meet NEPA's aims. This problem is the central problem EIS dele-
gation continues to pose. 
Because NEPA does not establish anyone agency to prepare or 
file an environmental impact statement, no set of delegation stan-
dards has emerged, and the federal courts are continuously con-
fronted with the problem of delegation. The courts are not, however, 
the only branch of government interpreting NEP A. The statute 
creates, in the Executive Office of the President, the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ).40 While the CEQ neither prepares 
nor files environmental impact statements, it promulgates regula-
tions "to tell agencies what they must do to comply with the proce-
dures and achieve the goals of the Act [NEP AJ. "41 CEQ regulations 
prescribe how a federal agency is to decide the scope of a planned 
EIS.42 But only two CEQ regulations address the problem of how 
to detect biased EIS preparation once the scope of the statement 
has been determined. 
The fortieth volume of the Code of Federal Regulations for 1984 
contains these two regulations in sections 1503.4 and 1506.5(c). Once 
a draft has circulated, the first of these two regulations requires 
federal agencies to explain why comments received from other fed-
eral agencies do not warrant further response. 43 This regulation aims 
to ensure that an agency filing an EIS has adequately addressed 
every federal concern about the proposed action. The second regu-
39 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
40 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 201 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 4341 et seq. (1982). 
41 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1984). 
42 40 C.F.R. § 1507.1 (1984). 
43 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a)(5) (1984). 
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lation specifically aims "to avoid any conflict of interest. "44 It requires 
private contractors who prepare an EIS to execute a disclosure 
statement "specifying that they have no financial or other interest 
in the outcome of the project. "45 Federal officials both prepare the 
disclosure statement and retain responsibility for the scope and con-
tent of the delegated EIS.46 
Since these two CEQ regulations are the only regulations that 
address the problem of ensuring adequate federal evaluation of a 
delegated EIS, it is necessary to stress again that it is case law that 
offers the most considerable body of law on EIS delegation. The 
reasons for this development go beyond NEP A's refusal to establish 
a single agency to prepare and/or evaluate EISs. The CEQ has only 
recently gained the right to make rulings that bind federal agencies. 
Until 1979, the CEQ offered guidelines that agencies were urged to 
follow but entitled to ignore. For the first nine years of NEPA's 
enforcement, only the courts decided which procedures NEP A le-
gally mandated. Six years after its passage, NEPA still posed so 
many unanswered questions that Justice Marshall, in Kleppe v. 
Sierra Club,47 remarked that "this vaguely worded statute seems 
designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for the development of 
a 'common law' of NEP A .... "48 Though each federal agency could 
promulgate regulations to satisfy NEPA after consulting with the 
CEQ,49 until 1979 the binding administrative authority to ensure 
uniform EIS preparation did not exist. When the Supreme Court 
declared in Andrus v. Sierra Club50 that the "CEQ's interpretation 
of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference,"51 the CEQ became 
the binding administrative authority interpreting NEPA. 
CEQ regulations now offer courts help in determining whether or 
not a delegated EIS has been objectively evaluated. In short, the 
enforcement of EIS requirements no longer depends ultimately on 
judicial evaluation of the statement. But CEQ regulations have not 
resolved the delegation question, or made judicial evaluation of it a 
simple matter of checking to see if the federal agency has followed 
certain procedures. Instead the regulations have followed the lead 
44 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (1984). 
45 [d. 
46 [d. 
47427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
48 [d. at 421. 
4. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1982). 
60 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
51 [d. at 358. 
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courts initially gave them. An examination of the case law reveals 
the complexities of EIS delegation, as well as the need for improved 
CEQ regulation and judicial evaluation. 
IV. GREENE COUNTY, IOWA CITIZENS, AND CONSERVATION 
SOCIETY 
Renewed attention to pre-1975 NEPA cases defines what consti-
tutes independent federal evaluation. These cases discuss the roots 
of the current law as well as its critique, much of which is still valid 
today. NEPA's 1975 amendment has not rendered irrelevant the 
reasoning behind the pre-1975 cases which sought to limit EIS del-
egation. These cases remain relevant because they rest upon a ju-
dicial restraint that is now especially appealing since courts cannot 
decide what independent federal evaluation entails. Courts that re-
fused to allow complete EIS delegation also refused to enter the 
debate about what constitutes independent federal evaluation. In-
stead they simply required the federal agency to prepare - not 
simply just accept responsibility for - the final draft EIS. 
Given the inconsistencies marring judicial review of federal eval-
uation since 1975, the pre-1975 restraint most courts showed in their 
limited evaluation of delegation appears increasingly attractive. The 
cases examined here shaped Congress' amendment of NEP A: that 
legacy remains their historical impact. The legal impact of these 
cases - what they reveal about the way courts approach delegation 
- has been overlooked. For this reason, the three approaches taken 
by pre-1975 courts need to be reexamined. 
Early NEPA cases that addressed the delegation issue tended to 
split between two main approaches. These cases either banned the 
delegation of final EIS preparation to a state or private party,52 or 
allowed such delegation provided that the court felt federal review 
to be sufficient. 53 A third approach banned delegation entirely, at 
52 Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972), a/I'd sub nom. 
Citizens for Balanced Environment and Transportation v. Volpe, 503 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1974), 
eert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Northside 
Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 244 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Arlington Coalition on 
Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th 
Cir. 1972). 
63 Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Pizitz, Inc. v. Volpe, 2 ELR 20378 (M.D. 
Ala. 1972), a/I'd, 461 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972); National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 
352 F.Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972); Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeways v. Brinegar, 
357 F.Supp. 1269 (D. Ariz. 1973); Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 
F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973); Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 500 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 
1973), eert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right v. Volpe, 355 
F.Supp. 933 (N.D. Ga. 1973); 1-291 Why? Association v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, a/I'd, 517 
F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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any stage of EIS preparation. Only one case adopted this approach, 
Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Trans-
portation. 54 It stands alone in both its ruling and its consequences: 
the case led Congress to amend NEP A in 1975 to allow delegation. 
In NEPA's first five years, the leading case against delegation is 
Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission. 55 
This case provides a rationale against delegation that is still appli-
cable today, despite the fact that Congress nullified the court's hold-
ing in NEP A's 1975 amendment. It will be examined first here. Most 
of these cases concerned highway projects; the leading case is Iowa 
Citizens for Environmental Quality v. Volpe. 56 In 1974, the court 
there presciently phrased the delegation problem that NEP A faces 
today. 
A. Greene County 
The cases permitting EIS delegation are best understood when 
viewed in the context of Greene County, which prohibited such 
delegation. From the beginning of its judicial interpretation, the E IS 
was seen as a decisionmaking tool. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Com-
mittee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 57 an early landmark NEPA 
. case, made it clear that a good faith consideration of environmental 
concerns is necessary to satisfy the statute. 58 In short, the EIS has 
to help the federal agency make a decision justifiable, rather than 
to justify a decision already made. As Senator Jackson had written 
about NEPA - and as Judge Skelly Wright had noted in Calvert 
Cliffs'59 - after NEPA every federal agency faces a mandate to 
consider the environmental consequences of its actions. 60 Against 
this background, in the first cases against delegation, courts adopted 
F.Supp. 933 (N.D. Ga. 1973); 1-291 Why? Association v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, afl'd, 517 
F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975). 
54 362 F.Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), afl'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d. Cir. 1974), affirmance vacated 
and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976). 
56 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
56 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973). 
57 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
68 [d. at 1113 n.5, 1114. 
69 [d. at 1113, nn. 5, 6. 
60 R. Andrews, supra note 4, at I. Interestingly, Senator Jackson actually wrote, in a law 
review article Andrews excerpts here, that the mandate NEPA imposes on the government 
is not only the statute's "most important feature" but also its "least recognized" one. See 
Jackson, Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1073,1079 
(1970). 
90 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:79 
the uncompromising stance that, in order to satisfy NEP A, a federal 
agency could not rely on an EIS it did not prepare.61 
No single case had framed the issues for debate until Greene 
County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission. 62 In that 
case, the court rejected the federal approval of a pumped storage 
power project because the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had 
used an EIS prepared by the Power Authority of the State of New 
York (P ASNY) in lieu of its own. 63 Though the FPC argued that it 
need not prepare its own EIS until making a final decision on the 
power project,64 the court found that such timing did not satisfy 
NEPA. Citing Calvert Cliffs',65 the court in Greene County noted 
61 The first case to address the extent to which a federal agency may delegate EIS prepa-
ration is Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F.Supp. 877 (D. Or. 1971). The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development's funding for a proposed high-rise apartment 
complex was admitted by HUD to be a "major" federal project for the purposes of § 102(2)(C). 
[d. at 879. Thus, NEPA applied. Delegation became an issue only when the court found the 
federal reliance on private information too great to satisfy NEPA. Unlike future delegation 
cases, there had not yet been any pre-arranged EIS preparation by a private party for federal 
use. 
After reviewing the agency's preliminary environmental impact statement, the court found 
that HUD's statement was "not the statement the statute demands." [d. at 880. Noting that 
the EIS had completely ignored the increase in traffic and population a high-rise would entail, 
the court stated bluntly that "the agency charged with environmental responsibility appears 
to have done virtually nothing except to take the promoter's worksheet at face value and 
endorse it without independent investigation." [d. 
Ignoring obvious impacts and offering no evidence of independent investigation were the 
first two criteria used by courts to test the legitimacy of a federal agency's reliance on 
information it had not gathered. The court in Goose Hollow, however, did not ban delegation 
as a matter of law. It concluded merely that NEPA's requirement of a good-faith consideration 
of environmental factors precluded the federal government from relying on information pre-
pared by the project's promoter. 
The first case in which a federal agency was permitted to rely on information it did not 
prepare is Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F.Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971). In Hardin, the court 
applied NEP A retroactively and permitted the federal agency to rely upon privately gathered 
information. In that case, U.S. Plywood had gathered information relevant to its operation of 
a pulp mill in a national forest. [d. at 105. When the U.S. Forest Service sought to rely on 
this information as its own, the court found no evidence of bias in the impact statement and 
allowed its federal use despite its private preparation. [d. at 126--127. 
The court, however, made it clear that it would not search for bias in cases in which the 
parties had notice of NEPA: "[n]othing in this opinion should be construed as implying that 
the procedures followed by the Forest Service in its efforts to comply with NEPA in this case 
will be found acceptable in the future under circumstances where it is fair to impute notice of 
the Act's provisions to all parties at or before the time a major federal project is conceived." 
[d. at 127. 
Were it not for the injustice of retroactive application, the Hardin court implied that NEPA 
would not excuse a federal agency from gathering and evaluating its own information. 
62 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
63 455 F.2d at 418-19. 
64 [d. 
65 Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1119, cited in Greene County Planning Board v. Federal 
Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
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that NEP A "is a mandate to consider environmental values 'at every 
distinctive and comprehensive stage of the [agency's] process.' The 
primary and nondelegable responsibility for fulfilling that function 
lies with the Commission."66 The court then issued the strongest 
condemnation of delegation the federal courts had yet made. 
The Federal Power Commission has abdicated a significant 
part of its responsibility by sUbstituting the statement of PASNY 
for its own. The Commission appears to be content to collate the 
comments of other federal agencies, its own staff and the inter-
venors and once again to act as an umpire. The danger of this 
procedure, and one obvious shortcoming, is the potential, if not 
likelihood, that the applicant's statement will be based upon self-
serving assumptions. 67 
Central to the court's stand· against delegation is the suspicion 
that an EIS prepared by interested parties will invariably be self-
serving,68 and therefore unable to advocate the public interest, a 
requirement NEPA demands69 and the Second Circuit7° emphasized. 
Though requiring the EIS to be federally prepared before any initial 
decision is made may delay such needed projects as the power facility 
in Greene County, the court there found delay to be "a concomitant 
of the procedures prescribed by NEPA"71 and refused to let "the 
spectre of a power crisis"72 prevent environmental impact evaluation. 
The federal agency, then, needed to use its staff to gather informa-
tion for the final EIS; neither the gathering of information, nor the 
responsibility for it, could be delegated. 73 While draft impact state-
ments prepared by state entities could be referred to in consultation 
with another agency, researching and writing the final E IS remained 
the job of the federal agency. 74 
The court in Greene County also extended the argument against 
delegation: it stopped a federal attempt to delegate EIS preparation 
to a state . agency. 75 Previous delegation cases had involved private 
66 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420 (citing, in part, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Commission 
v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971». 
67 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420 (footnote omitted). 
66 [d. 
69 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982). 
70 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 419 (citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal 
Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), eert. denied sub nom. Consolidated 
Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966». 
71 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 422. 
72 [d. at 422-23. 
73 [d. at 422. 
74 [d. 
7. Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420. 
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parties. 76 Before Greene County, courts had certified the lack of bias 
in the privately-prepared EIS before them.77 Courts preventing del-
egation made no statement to the effect that all privately-prepared 
EISs were tainted with self-interest.78 The court in Greene County, 
however, noted that state-prepared EISs would always suffer "the 
potential, if not the likelihood"79 of self-interested statements. 
B. Iowa Citizens 
The Greene County court's position against delegation departed 
from previous delegation decisions in another way. Greene County, 
like other delegation cases, involved an attack on the validity of 
building and construction permits. In 1972, when Greene County 
was decided, the majority of environmental impact statements in-
volved other types of projects. Nearly one-half of all EISs filed in 
the first two years of NEPA's existence concerned highways.8O Ac-
cordingly, most NEP A litigation involved highway projects. The 
strongest opposition to the Greene County rationale against dele-
gation came from these cases, and, in 1974, the approach Congress 
eventually took toward delegation emerged from one of them, Iowa 
Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe. 81 The path to 
Iowa Citizens, however, is a winding one, bearing evidence of the 
judicial disagreement which marks the early handling of EIS dele-
gation. 
In the months following the decision in Greene County,82 a number 
of circuit courts, in decisions involving highways, ruled against fed-
eral delegation of EIS preparation to state entities.83 These deci-
76 Goose Hollow involved a private developer seeking to build a high-rise apartment. See 
supra note 61. Hardin involved a corporation seeking to operate a pulp mill. See supra note 
61. 
77 Hardin, 325 F. Supp. at 126-27. 
78 Goose Hollow, 334 F. Supp. at 880. 
79 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420. 
80 Comment, The Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements by State Highway 
Commissions, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1268, 1268 n.7. 
81 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973). 
82 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 412. 
83 These decisions, however, do not always follow the Second Circuit's approach in limiting 
delegation. In Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), the court prevented the De-
partment of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) from relying 
on an environmental report prepared in one week by two Wisconsin state officials and released 
only one day before construction contracts for the highway were signed. Id. at 1033-34. The 
lack of consultation between state and federal officials, rather than suspicion of bias in the 
state-prepared EIS, was the basis for the court's invalidation of delegation. 
Though the timing of the EIS' release and the signing of the construction contracts for the 
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sions, however, did not form the trend. Most highway cases involving 
disputes over EIS preparation concluded that federal delegation of 
EIS preparation was valid under certain conditions. 84 
For example, National Forest Preservation Group v. Volp(/>5 ac-
knowledged Greene County's concerns, but found to be valid the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) delegation of responsi-
bility for EIS preparation.86 The FHWA delegation, accomplished 
through its Policy and Planning Memorandum 90-1 (PPM 90-1)87 was 
proper because PPM 90-1 required the FHWA division office to 
indicate review and adoption of the state-prepared draft EIS by 
signing and dating the statement before releasing it. 88 The National 
highway indicated improper federal evaluation in Scherr, when, ten years later, the FHWA 
approved funding for a New York City highway on the same day an EIS for the highway was 
released, the Scherr decision was not even mentioned. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983) and infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
In Daly v. Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972), the court considered an EIS prepared 
by a state for the FHWA. The court invalidated it, but only because it found no evidence of 
any federal evaluation of the EIS. NEPA, the court stated in its criticism of FHWA review 
of the EIS, "contemplates more deliberation than the time required to use a rubber stamp." 
Id. at 259. 
Only in two cases, Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972), 
and Northside Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 244 (E.D. Wis. 1972), did the 
courts follow the Greene County reasoning against delegation. Citing Greene County, the 
Northside Tenants' court stated that "NEPA's requirements attach to the federal agency, not 
to the recipient of federal aid, and it is the federal agency which must prepare the impact 
statement and balance the project's worth." 346 F. Supp. at 248. Committee to Stop Route 7 
followed the reasoning of Greene County most closely, finding "the very same danger of self-
serving assumptions that concerned the Court in Greene County . .. [to be] present here," 
346 F. Supp. at 741, and requiring the final EIS to be prepared by the federal official "as 
required by the plain wording of NEPA." Id. 
84 See supra note 53 for a partial listing of these cases. 
86 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972). 
B6 Id.at 125. 
f!1 Id. The court in National Forest Preservation Group validated the very delegation 
procedures that the Scherr v. Volpe, supra note 83, court felt gave no guarantee of adequate 
federal review. Confronting agency decision-making conducted under the same procedures, 
the court in Scherr v. Volpe did not imply that following PPM 90-1 offered adequate federal 
review; it declared instead that the record was silent as to the basis upon which the agency 
made its determination that no impact statement was required. Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d at 
1032. 
Though the agency decision in Scherr differed from that in National Forest Preservation 
Group, what is important to the development of the judicial attitude to delegation here is not 
the different outcome of the cases, but the reluctance of the courts to explain why procedures 
inadequate in one instance are adequate in another, virtually identical case. A similar problem 
is exemplified in the difference between the district and circuit courts' opinions in a single 
case, Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of Transportation, 362 F. 
Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974). See infra notes 122-27 and 
accompanying text. 
88 National Forest Preservation Group, 352 F. Supp. at 127. 
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Forest Preservation court agreed with Greene County's fear of a 
state's self-interested statements but did not imply - as Greene 
County89 did - the inevitability of such self-interest. The court 
wrote that "[t]here is no indication in this case that the EIS prepared 
by the HA [Montana highway administration] is self-serving. It 
should not be presumed that states are not concerned with the 
environmental problems facing us all. "90 The court in National Forest 
Preservation would neither examine the state's preparation nor 
judge the adequacy of the statement's federal evaluation. The 
FHWA official's dated signature alone satisfied the National Forest 
Preservation court that federal delegation of EIS preparation to a 
state agency did not violate NEP A. 
Other courts that allowed EIS delegation required factual evi-
dence that sufficient federal review had taken place to ensure against 
the state's purported self-interest. In Iowa Citizens for Environ-
mental Quality v. Volpe,91 the circuit court did find proof that the 
requirement for federal participation had been met, noting that the 
federal agency had recommended changes in the state's EIS and 
provided new information in the final EIS.92 Unlike previous cases 
allowing delegation, the court in Iowa Citizens did not simply an-
nounce a standard and at once say it had been met. The court instead 
found support, in the evidence before it, for a finding of unbiased 
preparation. This finding was made in a situation analogous to Greene 
County. 
In Iowa Citizens, the Iowa State Highway Commission had pre-
pared a final EIS for the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
to use in deciding whether or not to fund an interstate highway 
across tillable farmland. 93 Confronted with a situation in which the 
self-interest of the state was obvious, the Iowa Citizens court noted 
evidence that alternatives had been studied, and changes made in 
the state-prepared EIS following federal review. 94 Relying on this 
evidence, the court upheld the Iowa State Highway Commission's 
preparation of the EIS.95 Thus, Iowa Citizens recognized the possi-
bility of biased preparation, but did not let that possibility determine 
its holding. Unlike Greene County, Iowa Citizens did not let the fear 
89 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420. 
00 National Forest Preservation Group, 352 F. Supp. at 127. 
91 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973). 
92 [d. at 854. 
00 [d. at 853. 
94 [d. at 854. 
96 [d. at 854-55. 
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of bias ban the delegation of a final EIS. Instead, the Iowa Citizens 
decision demonstrated that courts could find evidence to support a 
finding that a state-prepared EIS is unbiased. 
The court in Iowa Citizens goes beyond the perfunctory validation 
of delegation that federal courts sometimes allow unthinkingly.96 But 
this case apparently split the court on the question that became the 
center of debate once Congress allowed delegation to the states in 
1975: how are courts to decide when federal review of a state-
prepared or privately-prepared EIS is sufficient to satisfy NEPA's 
demand that the federal government consider the effect of its actions 
on the environment? 
Though the majority of the court in Iowa Citizens allowed dele-
gation, the dissent by Judge Lay97 foresaw great difficulty and con-
tradiction in the attempt to judge the sufficiency of federal partici-
pation in EIS preparation. 
. . . [T]here exists a fundamental difference between the respon-
sibility for fact-gathering and making an independent objective 
appraisal of environmental impact as opposed to reviewing the 
self-serving declarations of a biased study by a state agency. 
Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 
455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972) .... Despite this difference, 
the majority opinion finds that there was substantial compliance 
with NEPA since the FHWA did not merely "rubber stamp" the 
state report but in fact required additional information to be 
added to the final statement. This overlooks the necessity and 
importance of federal preparation of the EIS early in the deci-
sionmaking process. There exists no real prophylactic, late in 
the game, to overcome the possibility of a state's biased pres-
entation of environmental factors. 98 
In short, while the Iowa Citizens majority found evidence supporting 
sufficient federa1.review of a state-prepared EIS, Judge Lay's dis-
sent concluded that, to use such evidence as the foundation for a 
96 In Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Volpe, 355 F.Supp. 933 (N.D. Ga. 1973), 
the court noted explicitly that "[t]he record is clear that the Secretary [of Transportation] did 
not merely rubber stamp the State's work, but rather reviewed, approved, and adopted the 
statement, thus making it his own." Id. at 938. The Tenth Circuit promptly adopted this 
language in Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe. 484 F.2d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 1973). 
Neither of these opinions contained explicit criteria designed to test the adequacy of the 
federal agency's review of the state-prepared EIS. They offered no guidance on how courts 
should address this problem. Instead, both Finish AUatoona's Interstate Right and Citizens 
Environmental Council simply announced a delegation standard of "objective review" and, 
without explanation, found that the standard had been met. 
97 Iowa Citizens, 487 F.2d at 855-68. 
98 Id. at 856. 
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rule of law that allowed delegation, raised the question of how to 
ensure NEPA's aims were met. 99 
Ultimately, the standards applied in Greene County and Iowa 
Citizens do not differ as much as their outcomes. Each court looked 
for proof of impartial federal preparation of the EIS; they differed 
only over the amount of federal preparation an EIS needed to ensure 
that federal responsibilities under NEPA were met. 100 The essential 
disagreement between these cases does not lie in the standards they 
employ. It lies instead in the debate over how the standard for 
delegation - a requirement that the federal government demon-
strate independent evaluation of the EIS - would be satisfied. 
The common law treatment of this question had already started 
when Congress amended NEPA to allow delegation. 101 Where 
Greene County bans delegation of the federal responsibility for a 
final EIS,102 Iowa Citizens allows that delegation, as long as evidence 
99 The rationale of Iowa Citizens appeared at least once before 1975 in a situation involving 
the delegation of EIS preparation to a private party. The issue in Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 
485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cen. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974), did not involve highways; it 
involved the construction of a airport runway. Id. at 464. But the court in Life of the Land 
nevertheless follows the rationale of Iowa Citizens to reach a result which Iowa Citizens, in 
its exclusive focus on the federal-state agency relationship, did not confront. Noting that "case 
law dealing with the delegation of EIS preparation has heretofore been limited to federal 
agency delegation to a state agency, and has pennitted such delegation where the federal 
agency significantly participated in the participation of the EIS," id. at 468, the Life of the 
Land court approved an EIS jointly prepared by the State of Hawaii, the federal government, 
and a private consulting finn. 
In doing so, the Life of the Land court became the first court to allow a financially-interested 
private party a role in the EIS. The court found "nothing ... in either the wording of NEPA 
or the case law, which indicates that, as a matter of law, a finn with a financial interest in the 
project may not assist with the drafting of the EIS." Id. at 467. To defend this finding against 
charges of undiscovered bias, the court noted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
officials met routinely with state officials from the beginning of the statement's preparation, 
id. at 467, and that the FAA officials had "continued active examination" of the EIS once the 
statement was sent to Washington. Id. 
The Life of the Land court did not, however, explore the content of the discussions during 
the routine meetings between the state officials, the FAA, and the private finn. Unlike Iowa 
Citizens, which had noted changes in the EIS, the court in Life of the Land noted only that 
such meetings had taken place, and did not attempt to see how - or if - they had influenced 
preparation of the EIS. Thus, if Iowa Citizens stands alone as the best example of how a 
court may judge a state-prepared EIS to be unbiased, then the Life of the Land decision 
illustrates how a court could construe virtually any federal-state contact to be evidence of 
sufficient federal review. 
One other case upholding a federal-private delegation, Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 
(5th Cir. 1974), viewed the federal agency much more suspiciously, remarking that even 
though private preparation of an EIS was not illegal, an agency's rubberstamping of it clearly 
was. 502 F.2d at 59. Public agencies cannot delegate their duties to private entities. Id. 
100 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420; Iowa Citizens, 487 F.2d at 854. 
101 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1982). 
102 Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420. 
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of federal evaluation of the EIS can be demonstrated. 103 It was over 
this point that the two sides of the delegation issue divided. Greene 
County and Iowa Citizens differ in their attempt to satisfy an iden-
tical standard, one that requires federal agencies to evaluate inde-
pendently information they have not gathered. The agencies can do 
so, either by preparing the final EIS themselves, or by offering 
evidence that they have sufficiently reviewed an EIS prepared by a 
state. 
Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of 
Transportation104 rejected the approaches of both Greene County 
and Iowa Citizens. The court barred any degree of delegation, re-
fusing to improve upon the standards for independent federal eval-
uation that both Greene County and Iowa Citizens had articulated 
in different ways. 
C. Conservation Society 
To understand how the congressional response to delegation has 
altered judicial consideration of it requires a review of Conservation 
Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Transportation. 105 C on-
servation Society, like the cases supporting delegation, involved a 
dispute over federal funding of a highway.106 However, unlike the 
other highway cases, the court in Conservation Society advanced a 
position against delegation so extreme that Congress overturned the 
court and amended NEPA to allow delegation of EIS preparation to 
state officials. 107 Seen in the light of Greene County and Iowa Citi-
zens, Conservation Society becomes an amalgam of the approaches 
to delegation taken in each case. 
The court in Conservation Society108 unhesitantly expanded the 
Greene County court's suspicion of state bias, and declared that 
conflicts between federal and state interests were not only inevitable 
but intentional: "it is impossible for the Vermont Highway Depart-
ment not to be an advocate of legislatively mandated construction 
and still act consistently with its duty as a state agency. "109 But the 
court nevertheless embarked upon the search for independent fed-
eral evaluation that had characterized Iowa Citizens. In Conserva-
103 Iowa Citizens, 487 F.2d at 854. 
104 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d. Cir. 1974), affirmance vacated 
and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976). 
106 Id. 
106 Conservation Society, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974). 
1M National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D)(l982). 
lOB Conservation Society, 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973). 
109 Id. at 631. 
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tion Society, this search led the court to conclude that "when the 
work [on the EIS] reached the final draft stage, the comments on it 
by the reviewing board were merely perfunctory, the equivalent of 
an agency rubber stamp. "110 Concluding that it could find "no indi-
cation whatsoever that the FHWA or any of its employees conceived, 
wrote, or even edited any section of or passage in the EIS,"l11 the 
Conservation Society court held to be improper the FHWA filing of 
an EIS prepared by the Vermont Highway Department. ll2 Despite 
the fact that the Vermont Highway Department had prepared the 
EIS under the same guidelines upheld in National Forest Preser-
vation Group v. Volpe,113 the Conservation Society court refused to 
validate the result. 
Confusion over the proper standard of delegation was further 
compounded by the court's inconsistent application of its own rule 
against biased EIS preparation. After proclaiming that states are 
necessarily biased, the Conservation Society court analyzed the facts 
in a way that disregarded their pronounced intolerance of bias. The 
court struck down the EIS, not because bias was present, but be-
cause it was present in unacceptable levels. 114 
In short, the court proceeded to judge the adequacy of federal 
evaluation of the EIS rather than to strike down the statement 
simply because the state had prepared it. Here, Conservation So-
ciety represents the federal judiciary's apparent inability to choose 
between Greene County and Iowa Citizens approaches to EIS del-
egation: the court voiced the former's suspicion of bias while applying 
the latter's standard to deal with its dangers. Predictably, then, the 
court in Conservation Society could inexplicably find bias in one place 
and not in another, despite the cases' factual similarities. After 
having declared all state agencies to be knowingly biased toward the 
accomplishment of their legislative mandate, the Conservation So-
ciety court then reasoned that the federal agency preparing the EIS 
could have "a mandate to achieve certain goals which conflict with 
the preservation of the environment. "115 The question of why con-
flicting mandates are permissible at the federal level but are indi-
cations of "inherent bias"116 at the state level was left unanswered 
by the court. 
110 [d. 
111 [d. at 632. 
112 [d. 
113 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
114 Conservation Society, 362 F. Supp. at 633. 
116 Conservation Society, 362 F. Supp. at 633. 
116 [d. 
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The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling in Conser-
vation Society,117 and adopted the view that states are invariably 
self-interested. For the first time, the Second Circuit interpreted 
Greene County to require completely federal EIS preparation.1I8 To 
support this view, the Conservation Society court quoted the CEQ 
guidelines then in effect, italicizing them for emphasis: "[i]n all 
cases, the agency should make its own evaluation of the environ-
mental issues and take responsibility for the scope and content of 
draft and final environmental statements. "119 Though the court 
viewed this rule as "strict adherence to the Greene County rule,"120 
it did not mention the possibility of permissible state EIS prepara-
tion on the draft level - participation that Greene County did al-
low. 121 
117 Conservation Society, 508 F.2d 927. 
118 I d. at 932. 
119Id. 
12°ld. 
121 The Second Circuit moved to correct the misreading of Greene County in 1-291 Why? 
Association v. Burns, 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975). 
In 1-291, the court stressed that Greene County did allow state participation in the EIS 
process. The court in 1-291 upheld "the standard of primary and nondelegable responsibility 
placed on the federal agency ... by NEPA," but refused the district court's interpretation of 
how Greene County would implement it. 517 F.2d at 1081 (discussing the district court's 
interpretation, 372 F.Supp. 223, 246 (D. Conn. 1974)). Instead, the 1-291 court noted that: 
[O]ur holding is not meant to imply that we agree with the district court's charac-
terization (at 372 F.Supp. 246 n.72) of our decision in Green [sic] County Planning 
Board, supra, as establishing a per se rule to the effect that state participation in 
the preparation of an EIS renders it invalid. 
517 F.2d at 108I. 
Although the circuit court's position in 1-291 is a retreat from Greene County, it is necessary 
to stress here that the 1-291 court was correct. The court in Greene County had never promoted 
an absolute ban on state participation in the EIS; it allowed that participation, restricting it 
to the draft level to ensure that the federal government made a decision apart from the state's 
interests. Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420. 
Though 1-291 attracted no legislative attention when Congress amended NEPA in 1975, the 
case was decided in the same year, several months before NEPA's amendment, and almost 
certainly in response to the amendment's impending passage. By May 30, 1975, when 1-291 
was decided, the actions that would lead Congress to amend the statute already had been 
taken. See infra notes 141-43. 
In dispelling the notion that the court in Greene County banned all delegation, the 1-291 
court acknowledged that certain circumstances could justify a measure of delegation and 
implicitly declared the courts capable of detecting these circumstances. This finding is an 
important one lest the differences between such cases as Greene County and Iowa Citizens 
be overestimated. 
The court's comments in 1-291 regarding the Greene County decision illustrate that the 
judicial treatment of delegation in Greene County and in Iowa Citizens is not as different as 
the outcomes of each case might indicate. Before Iowa Citizens was even decided, the standard 
of independent federal investigation the case is now known for had been seen as part of Greene 
County. Not until much later did courts read Greene County as a case banning delegation. 
Originally, Greene County was viewed to impose upon federal agencies the duty to investigate 
100 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:79 
On appeal the Conservation Society court failed to explain why 
there was compelling reason to defer to CEQ guidelines when it had 
allowed the lower court to disregard the FHWA regulations. The 
Vermont Highway Department had acted pursuant to those regu-
lations, and earlier cases had upheld them. l22 Rather than explain 
such selective deference, the court simply asserted the importance 
of the CEQ guidelines, and ruled that requiring federal EIS prepa-
ration at both draft and final levels still allowed for sufficient state 
participation because the CEQ had confronted the dangers of dupli-
cative work or unheeded suggestions. 123 
It is contended that the FHW A is not involved in planning a 
particular project from the earliest stages, and thus does not 
have the advantages of information available to the state. This 
handicap is minimized, however, for the CEQ guidelines ex-
plicitly preserve sufficient flexibility for the federal agency to 
solicit and integrate information from state agencies. 124 
In Conservation Society neither the district nor the circuit courts 
may be faulted for choosing between two opposing sets of proce-
dures. The FHWA and the CEQ did give contradictory instructions 
to the persons preparing the EIS: the FHWA Policy and Procedure 
Memorandum 90-1 allowed state EIS participation on certain 
levels125 while the CEQ regulation did not. 126 Though Conservation 
Society made a necessary choice between one standard and another, 
it failed to explain how the CEQ regulations would succeed where 
the FHWA regulations would fail. The circuit court's ruling in Con-
servation Society simply did not explain how its decision would 
insulate federal EIS preparation from state bias. Instead, the court 
declared that the federal official should take responsibility for the 
EIS; and future courts were left without any basis upon which to 
decide if federal officials had shouldered their burden. That omission 
seems ironic next to the Conservation Society court's clearly ex-
pressed conclusion regarding the central issue before it: the C onser-
vation Society court recognized that it needed to "clarify definitively 
independently. See Comment, Environmental Impact Statements - A Duty of Independent 
Investigation by Fedeml Agencies, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 161 (1972). 
122 See supra notes 87-90, 106 and accompanying text. 
123 Conservation Society, 508 F.2d at 932. 
124 Id. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(c) (1974) required the federal agency in all cases to be responsible 
for the scope and context of both the draft and the final EIS. 
125 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra note 118. 
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the respective roles of agency and court in effectuating the Congres-
sional purposes. "127 
The clarification sought by the court in Conservation Society was 
important not merely because the courts lacked a legal standard by 
which to judge the validity of federal EIS delegation to states and 
private parties. In Conservation Society, the court confronted the 
practical difficulties presented by EIS delegation. While Greene 
County feared the self-interest of the states, and Iowa Citizens 
sought to allay that fear by searching for independent federal EIS 
evaluation, Conservation Society also confronted a federal defendant 
that claimed it could not act without reliance on the supposed bias 
of state officials. l28 In response to the FHWA's argument that the 
fourteen employees it had in Vermont could not prepare as thorough 
an EIS as the Vermont Highway Department's hundreds of employ-
ees,129 the Conservation Society district court wrote: 
This is, however, an argument to take to Congress, seeking 
either more funds for the conduct of the federal agency opera-
tions, a change in NEPA to permit such delegation, or the simple 
authority to use its existing funds in the preliminary exploration 
of environmental impacts at the early stages of federal-state 
highway planning. l30 
Once the Second Circuit specifically upheld the district court's de-
cision,131 the most practical argument yet advanced for delegation132 
was rejected. Congress, however, accepted Conservation Society's 
invitation to amend NEP A. 
In the five years since NEPA's passage, then, courts had required, 
almost unanimously, that the federal agency filing an EIS indepen-
dently evaluate all statements it did not prepare itself. Debate over 
how a federal agency could meet this standard led to Greene County 
and Iowa Citizens. Yet, until Conservation Society, no court had 
127 Conservation Society, 508 F.2d at 932. 
128 Conservation Society, 362 F. Supp. at 631-32. 
129 Conservation Society, 362 F. Supp. at 631-632. 
130 Id. 
131 Conservation Society, 508 F.2d at 932 n.24. 
132 The district court's opinion in 1-291 reveals the states' side of this same argument. 372 
F. Supp. 223, 245-46 n.71 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975). There, a 
Connecticut Department of Transportation official requested "that the role of environmental 
statement preparation be removed from the basic design team and placed in the hands of 
specialist personnel, properly qualified .... " The designer of a highway, the official continued, 
"cannot continue to be held responsible for the assembly and preparation of environmental 
statements without serious consequence." To continue to hold state officials responsible would 
be "asking too much." 372 F.Supp. at 245-46 n.71. 
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required exclusively federal EIS preparation. When the court in 
Conservation Society did so, Congress reacted with the only major 
amendment to NEP A since its passage. 
V. THE 1975 AMENDMENT TO NEPA 
Congress' amendment of NEP A invalidated the per se ban on 
delegation that Conservation Society made possible, and made del-
egation of EIS preparation to states legal under NEPA.l33 Under 
the statute,l34 federal delegation to the states was allowed if: the 
state agency preparing the EIS had statewide jurisdiction;l35 the 
federal official responsible for delegation furnished guidance in the 
EIS preparation;136 independent federal evaluation was made prior 
to approval;137 and certain notice provisions were met. 138 These con-
ditions apply whenever EIS preparation is delegated to the states, 
but the amendment does not limit delegation to the states or to 
agencies having only statewide jurisdiction. Following the conditions 
outlined above, the amendment specifically provides that it "does 
not affect the legal sufficiency of statements prepared by State agen-
cies with less than statewide jurisdiction. "139 In effect, then, the 
amendment allows delegation to local agencies but does not attempt 
to set standards for that delegation. 
The amendment to NEP A resolves only one of the issues that 
prior cases raised: it legalized federal delegation of EIS preparation 
to the states. The amendment's second and third conditions for 
delegation are mere codifications of - not advancements beyond -
the standards of Greene County and Iowa Citizens. The amended 
NEP A offers no assistance to courts in developing standards 
whereby the bias feared by the courts in Greene County could be 
avoided. The amendment, like the decisions in Greene County and 
Iowa Citizens, simply states in section 4332(2)(D)(ii) and (iii) that 
such bias should be avoided. The Senate Report noted that the 
133 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D), 42 u.s.c. § 4332(2)(D) (1982). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at § 4332(2)(D)(i) (1982). 
136Id. at § 4332(2)(D)(ii) (1982). 
137Id. at § 4332(2)(D)(iii) (1982). 
138 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D)(iv) 
(1982). The federal official must provide "early notification to, and [solicit] the views of, any 
other State or any Federal land management entity of any action or any alternative thereto 
.... " Id. This provision only applies to EISs involving the mandates offederalland manage-
ment agencies. 
139 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1982). 
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amendment "reflects procedures suggested in CEQ guidelines, sev-
eral circuit court decisions, and agency regulations. Thus, in a sense 
its intent is to 'enact existing law. "'140 
Given the disagreement in the circuits over the proper standard 
for federal participation, the congressional action might appear to 
be a codification of confusion. But the concerns that moved Congress 
to write section 4332(2)(D), and the context in which the statute 
passed, suggest that the Congress did not want to face the most 
pressing legal issues raised by delegation while confronting a poten-
tially explosive political situation. Shortly after the decision in Con-
servation Society, two other cases adopted its rationale and invali-
dated delegation. 141 That neither of these cases were decided by the 
Second Circuit indicated that the rationale of Conservation Society 
was spreading. Contemporaneously, the FHWA ignored CEQ pro-
tests to the effect that only minor administrative changes were 
needed to meet Conservation Society, and ordered "an almost total 
halt"142 to all federally-funded highway projects within the Second 
Circuit's jurisdiction. The action further hurt a construction industry 
already suffering from recession, and sparked the first congressional 
proposals to overturn Conservation Society. 143 
It was against this background that Congress began to examine 
Conservation Society and the judicial interpretation of NEPA, 
which, by 1975, was the common law of NEP A. The Senate Report 
on the proposed amendment to NEPA framed legislatively the issue 
raised in Conservation Society with a succinctness not duplicated by 
any court: 
A vigorous debate has developed over the meaning and impact 
of the ruling - i.e., whether it permits substantial state prep-
aration of a draft EIS as is suggested in the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality guidelines and the rulings in several other 
circuits, or whether it requires the Federal agency to prepare 
the EIS ab initio. 144 
The same report continued to note that cases involving delegation 
continually confronted one issue: "the extent of permissible delega-
tion of EIS preparation duties by the Federal agencies to consul-
140 S. REP. No. 94-152, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 859, 866. 
141 Swain V. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); Appalachian Mountain Club V. Brinegar, 
394 F. Supp. 105 (D. N.H. 1975). 
142 S. REP. No. 94-152, supra note 140, at 860. 
143 [d. at 862. 
144 [d. at 859-60. 
104 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:79 
tants, state governments, other governmental units, or private ap-
plicants. "145 Despite the different outcomes of Greene County and 
Iowa Citizens, the Senate Report recognized that the element com-
mon to the major delegation cases was "the requirement for exten-
sive Federal agency involvement in the preparation of environmental 
impact statements. "146 Congress needed to decide not the need for 
federal involvement, but its necessary extent. 
Given this awareness of the task Congress faced, the statute as it 
was finally enacted is more notable for what it omits than for what 
it includes. In H.R. 3787,147 an alternative version of H.R. 3130 (the 
bill Congress passed), Congress refused to delegate EIS preparation 
as broadly. H. R. 3787 restricted delegation to the three states of 
the Second Circuit and then only allowed delegation for highway 
projects. 148 Such restricted delegation recognized and responded to 
the problems raised by NEPA in the courts: highway cases had 
generated by far the largest number of cases allowing delegation. 149 
Yet the Senate Report on the bill it passed inexplicably neglects to 
consider restricting provisions for EIS delegation to highway proj-
ects. Citing the adoption of the reasoning in Conservation Society 
by courts outside the Second Circuit,15O the Senate Report rejects 
H.R. 3787's geographical limitations and says nothing about its legal 
limitations on delegation. 151 Then, after having acknowledged that 
both courts and agencies had developed the same procedures ap-
proved in H.R. 3130,152 and that courts and agencies had often con-
fronted the issue, the Senate Report neglects to discuss the problem 
of fixing responsibility for EIS delegation. Instead, the Senate Re-
port simply asserts that the bill it supports provides "a uniform, 
national procedure. "153 As to just how H. R. 3130 - the bill that 
became the amendment to NEPA - provided this procedure, the 
Congress remained silent. 
H.R. 3787, however, conflicted with H.R. 3130 in another way 
that goes to the heart of NEP A: it would confront the question of 
delegation not by amending NEPA, but by amending the federal-
145Id. 
146Id. at 861. 
147Id. at 865. 
148 Id. at 864-65. 
149 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
150 S. REP. No. 94-152, supra note 140, at 860. 
151 Id. at 865. 
162 I d. at 864--65. 
163 I d. at 865. 
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aid highway law to allow delegation only in highway projects. 154 This 
approach was a step toward the recodifying, agency-by-agencyap-
proach that Senator Jackson and Professor Caldwell had discussed 
in the Senate hearings on NEP A.155 Again, recodification was re-
jected. But this rejection of recodification, though recognizing the 
dangers the approach faced, avoided the specificity that the proposed 
recodification sought. The Senate Report merely stated that it is 
"firmly opposed to this method of amending NEP A indirectly 
through amendments to other laws or provisions in other legisla-
tion. "156 
Though Congress refused to be any more specific than the courts 
had been already, the Senate Report discussed one answer to the 
question presented by delegation litigation. It was not, however, 
incorporated in the statute. 
In order to avoid the danger . . . of constant judicial testing of 
whether the degree of delegation of EIS preparation duties is 
permissible or impermissible, the Committee strongly urges the 
affected Federal agencies to carefully document their guidance 
and participation in the preparation, and their independent re-
view, of the EIS. In particular, the Committee wishes to em-
phasize the necessity of maintaining in each Federal agency, and 
fully using during the preparation and evaluation of the EIS's, 
a highly trained and interdisciplinary staff. 157 
Congress never included in the statute an explicit requirement for 
careful documentation of the federal guidance and participation. Sim-
ilarly, while rejecting recodification, the Congress neglected to re-
quire the interdisciplinary staff it claimed to value. Yet the Senate 
Report did not question testimony that "[i]n no case would H.R. 3130 
permit delegation to any state agency lacking sufficient resources, 
personnel, and interdisciplinary expertise .... "158 Despite acknowl-
edging in the Senate Report that "[p ]roper documentation and use 
of staff are the best means of reassuring whose [sic] who might level 
the 'rubber stamping' charge, or, should the charge be made, of 
disproving it, "159 Congress did nothing to require either step. 
164 [d. 
165 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
166 S. REP. No. 94-152, supra note 140, at 865. 
167 [d. at 868. 
168 Statement by Russell W. Peterson, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, Before 
a Joint Meeting of the Senate Interior Committee and the Transportation Subcommittee of 
the Senate Public Works Committee on May 5, 1975, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1975 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 871,873. 
169 S. REP. No. 94-152, supra note 140, at 868. 
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One further omission gave the statute yet another generality that 
promised to weaken NEPA in the years following the amendment's 
passage. While the Senate Report refused to consider H. R. 3787 
because the bill specifically singled out the FHWA,l60 the same re-
port stated that "H.R. 3130 is designed to affect one kind of agency 
action only. "161 "That action, most typical of the Federal Highway 
Administration, involve[d] the granting of massive federal funding 
to a statewide agency, with a relatively minor substantive federal 
involvement. "162 Congress, however, never placed such a limitation 
on EIS delegation in its amendment to NEPA. Furthermore, it was 
not until five more years - and more litigation - passed that a 
federal court limited the statute's application to the areas specified 
by the legislative history.l63 The decision in 1980, however, came too 
late to prevent the abuse of delegation that flowed from the congres-
sionally'sanctioned vagueness of the amendment to NEPA. In July, 
1975, Congress enacted H.R. 3130 and amended NEPA.l64 
As long as the federal agency sufficiently reviews the statement, 
the delegation of EIS preparation to state agencies is legal. Congress 
did not, however, seek to ensure that federal agencies would thor-
oughly review the statement, nor did it give courts guidelines for 
determining the adequacy of review. Nevertheless, faced with the 
lower court's declaration in Conservation Society that a state could 
not prepare an EIS, and Congress's later decision that it could, the 
Supreme Court vacated Conse1"l:Jation Society and remanded the case 
to the Second Circuit. l65 There, in Conservation Society II,l66 the 
court split along the same lines that courts before Conservation 
Society I had split - but the majority now supported delegation. 167 
160 I d. at 865. 
161Id. at 866. 
162 Id. 
168 Greenspon v. Federal Highway Administration, 488 F.Supp. 1374 (D. Md. 1980). 
164 f;l. REP. No. 94-152, supra note 140, at 859. 
166 Conservation Society, 423 U.S. 809 (1975). 
166 Conservation Society, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976). 
167 When the case was before the Second Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court, the 
Conservation Society II court split over the question of independent federal evaluation. Noting 
that the legislative history of 42 U .S.C. § 4332(2)(D) "makes it clear that the Congress intended 
to overturn our decision in Conservation Society/' 531 F.2d at 639, the majority reversed 
their earlier ruling against delegation. In a per curiam opinion, they noted that verbal 
communication, meetings, EIS circulation and review had occurred between federal and state 
officials, and concluded "that there was compliance with the procedural requirements of Public 
Law No. 94-83 [42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D)]." Id. 
Judge Adams' dissenting opinion exemplifies the unresolved debate that the generalities of 
NEPA's amendment failed to resolve. He noted that "the legislative purpose was to modify 
1985] EIS DELEGATION 107 
This split foreshadowed a judicial reluctance to invalidate a legiti-
mately delegated but insufficiently reviewed EIS. 
VI. A WEAKENED NEPA: THE DELEGATION ISSUE AFTER 1975 
Since 1975, when Congress answered the question of EIS author-
ship, courts have confronted an increasing array of delegation prob-
lems. The problem of federal-state delegation of EIS preparation 
has been compounded by the delegation of EIS preparation to pri-
vate parties. As courts have answered questions raised by the 
amendment of NEPA's EIS requirement, they have also confronted 
the difficulty of reconciling their responsibility to guard against im-
proper delegation with the legislature's explicit wish to permit del-
egation. In practice, this tension has left courts reluctant to insist 
upon any single standard for adequate federal review. 
Given that no judicial standard has emerged and Congress has 
continued to be silent on the subject, only the Council on Environ-
mental Quality has addressed the problem. In guidelines published 
in 1978, now binding as regulations on every federal agency,168 the 
CEQ requires that private contractors preparing EISs sign disclo-
sure statements "specifying that they have no financial or other 
interest in the outcome of the project."169 While this regulation does 
much to prevent private parties from failing to meet responsibilities 
delegated to them, it does not address the state bias that originally 
created the delegation problem. Responding to that omission, courts 
are increasingly permissive in sanctioning delegation, upholding del-
egations no court before 1975 allowed. 
This increasingly permissive standard can be explained by the two 
radically different ways delegation has developed. First, when Con-
gress allowed federal agencies to delegate EIS preparation to the 
states, it did not make that responsibility nondelegable once the 
states received it.170 As a result, states undertaking the job of EIS 
and to clarify the rigid standard that Congress perceived the Conservation Society [ court 
had established for federal involvement in the preparation and drafting of the environmental 
impact statement (EIS)." [d. at 640. Judge Adams wrote that "the degree of federal control 
mandated by the modified statute" had not been exercised in the case, based on the record 
before him. [d. But despite a lengthy examination of the NEPA amendment's legislative 
history, Judge Adams based his position against delegation on the very facts the majority had 
cited to support delegation. [d. at 641-44. Neither side could find in the modified NEPA any 
factual rationale for its decision. 
168 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5 (1983). 
169 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (1983). 
170 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) is silent 
on the issue of state delegation of EIS preparation to private parties. The amendment, 
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preparation have delegated it to private parties, and consulting firms 
have begun to playa significant role in EIS preparation. This dele-
gation has complicated the task of uncovering biased EIS prepara-
tion. It is, however, a delegation NEPA allows. The leading case in 
this area is Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers. 171 
A. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers 
and EIS Delegation 
The current judicial attitude toward an agency's delegation of EIS 
preparation has developed gradually. The first case to interpret the 
1975 amendment's requirement that state-prepared EISs receive 
sufficient federal review was the Second Circuit's decision in Con-
servation Society.172 The trend since 1975 clearly favors delegation 
in a way neither Greene County nor Iowa Citizens would endorse. 
Courts, aware that Congress amended NEP A when the statute's 
requirements delayed highway construction, have not been inclined 
to accept delay as the price of enforcing NEPA. Where Greene 
County173 had considered delay an acceptable cost of following NEPA 
and ordered a guarantee from the agency of non-biased EIS prepa-
ration, courts no longer accept delay and will uphold even an EIS 
prepared by private parties who have a financial interest in the 
project.174 Courts have also allowed local agencies to participate in 
however, provides that it "does not affect the legal sufficiency of statements prepared by 
State agencies with less than statewide jurisdiction." [d. 
171 Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N. Y. 
1982), partially aff'd, partially vacated, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983). The second way in 
which delegation has been shaped resurrects the recodification controversy surrounding NE-
PA's passage and raises political considerations beyond the scope of this article. This delegation 
goes outside NEPA altogether: regulations and statutes passed after NEPA now allow agen-
cies acting under various statutes to delegate EIS preparation directly to private parties 
which then assume the entire responsibility for satisfying NEPA. This delegation frequently 
circumvents NEPA's aims and will be examined briefly to explain cases which have upheld 
EIS delegations incompatible with the statute. 
One statute that permits delegation of NEPA responsibilities is the Federal Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301' et seq. (1982). For the legislative 
history of this delegation, see NOTIS-McCONARTY, Fedeml Accountability: Delegation of 
Responsibility by HUD Under NEPA, 5 ENVTL. AFFAIRS 121 (1976). For the regulatory 
delegation of NEP A responsibilities, see infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text. 
172 Conservation Society, 531 F.2d at 637. 
173 Greene County, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972). 
174 See, e.g., Essex County Preservation Association v. Campbell, 399 F. Supp. 208 (D. 
Mass. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1976), where the court upheld an EIS prepared by 
the same private consulting firm that Massachusetts had employed to serve as design engineer 
for the highway project in question. 536 F.2d at 960. Even though the district court had found 
that "there was considerable federal review, discussion and revision of the EIS" as the 
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EIS preparation. Courts will not view an EIS as inevitably biased 
if some of its preparation has been done by an agency with less than 
statewide jurisdiction. 175 Thus NEPA apparently does not limit the 
authority of the states to delegate EIS preparation once they have 
received the job. 176 
Courts interpreting NEP A's amendment, then, have increased 
federal agencies' latitude with respect to the delegation of EIS prep-
aration. Though they have done so in direct response to NEPA's 
statement was being developed by the engineering firm, the EIS was invalidated on the 
grounds that it was biased. 399 F.Supp. at 214-15. The First Circuit reversed. The court held 
for the first time that an EIS is not improperly delegated to a private party when evidence 
of independent federal evaluation prior to the EIS approval is given. 536 F.2d at 960 . 
. Since Essex County, courts have reaffirmed repeatedly the legality of private preparation 
of the EIS by a financially-interested party. See Hart and Miller Islands Area Environmental 
Group v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 505 F. Supp. 732, 750 (D. Md. 1980) 
(participation of a project's design engineers in preparing an impact statement "does not 
necessarily fatally undermine the impact ofthe statement"); No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F.Supp. 
334, 353 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (dismissing arguments against private preparation of tlie EIS as 
"vague" and "unsupported" by the record): Residents in Protest - I-35E v. Dole, 583 F.Supp. 
653 (D. Minn. 1984) (allowing the private preparer of an EIS to drop further mention of 
alternatives to the project in the final statement, even though the alternatives had been 
mentioned in the draft EIS). 
175 Greenspon v. Federal Highway Administration, 488 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Md. 1980), in-
volved an EIS prepared for a highway project by the Interstate Division of Baltimore City, 
a joint city-state agency with jurisdiction only in Baltimore. Id. at 1376. The plaintiffs, who 
owned property that would be affected by the highway, protested federal use of this EIS. 
The court was then confronted with the confusion left by the NEP A amendment over the 
statute's failure to provide a distinction between a state official and a local one for the purposes 
of EIS preparation. 
In Greenspon, the court noted that the amendment allowing delegation was not intended 
to cover local officials and agencies, but that its definitions of "[sltate agency or official" were 
never clarified to ensure this exclusion. Id. To resolve the question, the court decided that 
NEPA's amendment applied to certain types of projects but not to others. Having considered 
the amendment's legislative history, the court held that the NEPA amendment applied "only 
where massive federal grants to statewide agencies are involved, with relatively minor federal 
involvement. A prime example is a federal highway grant." Id. at 1380. After the Greenspon 
decision, agencies are not subject to the conditions of NEPA's amendment when the agency 
receiving grants from the federal government has less than statewide jurisdiction. The Green-
spon court thus allowed local agencies to prepare EISs, but did not opine as to which standards 
were to apply when the federal delegation led to EIS preparation by local agencies or private 
parties. Nevertheless, no one has questioned the Greenspon court's determination that NE-
PA's amendment does not preclude EIS preparation by local agencies or private parties. 
The NEPA amendment itself does not limit the extent to which states may delegate EIS 
preparation to local agencies or private parties. Thus, although it involved a highway, the 
Greenspon holding places EIS delegation for non-highway projects back to Greene County 
and 1972: states may delegate EIS preparation to local agencies. The subsequent actions of 
these agencies - at least in projects not involving highways - appear to be unaffected by 
NEPA. In effect, Greenspon frees the federal government of the requirement that it inde-
pendently evaluate the state-prepared EISs in certain circumstances. 
176 Iowa Citizens, 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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amendment allowing delegation, courts permitting such delegation 
have received no further word from Congress as to the standards 
for delegation. Congress has remained silent, although the increased 
pervasiveness of delegation since 1975 has created greater danger 
of bias as well as of suppression of environmental concerns. 
Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 177 a case 
involving the proposed Westway Highway in New York City, 178 
illustrates how these dangers have been realized and how courts 
may uncover them. This case involves a number of delegations, from 
the federal government to the state, from the state to a private 
party, and, finally, from one private party to another. 179 While Sierra 
Club reveals how excessive delegation insulates bias from discovery, 
and may prevent independent federal evaluation of the EIS, the case 
also demonstrates how a court may examine the record to determine 
the extent of state bias and independent federal evaluation. For this 
reason, Sierra Club is the most significant case involving EIS dele-
gation since Greene County and Iowa Citizens. 
The administrative record in Sierra Club is long and complex, but 
its details provide the best example of the way in which excessive 
delegation can warp decisionmaking and require the court's diligent 
attention to the record. The events leading to Sierra Club began in 
1971, when New York City, New York State, and the Federal High-
,way Administration agreed to replace the southernmost portion of 
the city's decaying West Side Highway.1BO The highway eventually 
proposed as a result of this agreement was called Westway. Planning 
started in 1972, when New York State and New York City estab-
lished an administrative entity called the West Side Highway Project 
("the Project"). 181 
Placed under the jurisdiction of the N ew York State Department 
of Transportation (NYSDOT)l82 - an agency allowed to prepare an 
EIS under the terms of NEPA's amendment - the Project was 
"comprised almost entirely of outside consulting firmS."l83 In 1974, 
two years after its formation, the Project issued a draft EIS outlining 
five alternatives to Westway and discussing the proposed highway's 
impact on Hudson River fisheries. l84 The Project's draft EIS, rep-
177 Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983). 
178Id. at 1016. 
179Id. at 1017. 
180 Id. 
181Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
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resenting the efforts of various consulting firms, relied for its fish-
eries information on a 1973 biological survey conducted by one of its 
consulting firms. 185 Three years after the draft's release, on January 
4, 1977, the Project issued its final EIS.186 It recommended West-
way's construction and was signed by both the NYSDOT and the 
FHWA.187 On the same day, the final EIS appeared and the FHWA-
approved funding for Westway.l88 
Several months later, NYSDOT applied to the U. S. Army Corps 
of Engineers for a permit to approve a landfill of the Hudson River 
that Westway's construction would require. 189 Immediately after the 
Corps posted notice of the permit, the Fisheries Service, the Wildlife 
Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ob-
jected. l90 Their objections concerned the landfill's impact on fisheries; 
the Corps forwarded them to the Project and made no further re-
ply.191 The Project responded by repeating the conclusions of its final 
EIS and calling the EPA "biased."192 In December, 1978, however, 
the EPA persuaded NYSDOT to conduct further studies of the 
region the landfill would affect. 193 The Project then commissioned an 
engineering firm to make a study.194 By the end of 1979, the engi-
neering firm's study had revealed significant numbers of fish in the 
area of the proposed landfill. 195 
A draft report the firm issued in August, 1980 led to a meeting 
that month between the engineering firm, the Project, and the 
FHWA to discuss how to mitigate the landfill's potentially adverse 
impact on fish. 196 The Corps was not then present; it received the 
firm's final report in September, 1980. 197 Over the continuing objec-
tions of the Sierra Club - which had seen the firm's August 1980 
draft198 - and of the Fisheries Service, the Wildlife Service, and 
185 [d. 
186 [d. at 1018. 
187 [d. at 1019. 
188 [d. The decision to release the EIS on the same day the agency responsible for it decided 
to fund the project for which the statement was prepared recalls Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 
1027 (7th Cir. 1972), a case that involved similarly suspect timing. See supra note 83 and 
accompanying text. 
189 Sierra Club, 701 F.2d at 1019-20. 
190 [d. at 1021-22. 
191 [d. at 1022. 
192 [d. 
198 [d. 
194 [d. 
195 [d. at 1023. 
196 [d. 
197 [d. 
198 [d. 
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the EPA,199 the Corps relied on the Project's final January 1977 EIS 
and issued the landfill permit on February 18, 1981.200 When the 
government agencies protesting the Corps' action decided not to 
appeal its decision, the Sierra Club filed a suit of its own in March, 
1981. 201 Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers 
resulted. The case confirms the danger of bias discussed in Greene 
County, and meaningfully applies the standard of independent fed-
eral evaluation seen in Iowa Citizens. Confronting the plaintiff's 
claim that the Corps was relying on a biased EIS, District Court 
Judge Thomas Griesa did not merely announce that delegation was 
allowed by NEP A without further inquiry into the review of the 
EIS the Corps sought to use. Rather, Judge Griesa scrutinized the 
administrative record before him more thoroughly than any previous 
judge in a delegation case. 
After a sentence-by-sentence comparison of contemporaneous 
FHWA memos about the August, 1980 meeting between the FHWA, 
the Project, and the engineering firm studying fishery impact, 202 
Judge Griesa found the testimony of the Project's representatives 
on the memos and their own ignorance of adverse fishery impact 
"entirely unconvincing."203 The Project, Judge Griesa found, "knew, 
or should have known, that they had no basis"204 for asserting that 
the landfill would have no adverse impact. He also examined memos 
exchanged between NYSDOT, the FHWA, and the Corps and con-
cluded that the FHWA and NYSDOT "were instrumental in per-
suading the Corps to withhold fisheries information. "205 The FHWA's 
communication with the Corps concerning the engineering firm re-
port was so selective that Judge Griesa declared FHWA testimony 
about its contact with the Corps to be untrue and its statements to 
the Corps to be "simply fraudulent. "206 Given this record, the district 
court struck down the Corps' attempt to rely on the EIS prepared 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 1024. 
201 Id. Sierra Club v. United States Anny Corps of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983), 
was not the first case filed in opposition to Westway's construction. However, it has proceeded 
further than the two previous suits seeking to block the highway. See Action for Rational 
Transit v. West Side Highway Project, 517 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D.N. Y. 1981) and Action for 
Rational Transit v. West Side Highway Project, 536 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 
699 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1983). 
202 Sierra Club, 541 F. Supp. 1367, 1375 (S.D.N. Y. 1982). 
203 I d. at 1376. 
204 Id. at 1370. 
205Id. at 1369. 
206 Id. at 1379. 
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by the Project and ordered the Corps to prepare a supplemental 
EIS.207 
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that NEP A's amendment did 
not permit the Corps' reliance because the amendment applied to 
the FHWA - a funding agency - and not to the Corps, a permitting 
agency.208 The circuit court, however, reversed the district court's 
order that the Corps prepare a supplemental EIS on both fishery 
and nonfishery issues raised by Westway and limited the Corps' 
statement to fisheries. 209 Despite its partial reversal of the lower 
court, the Second Circuit upheld that court's close scrutiny of the 
administrative record. Based on the evidence that Judge Griesa had 
so thoroughly examined, the Second Circuit was able to state con-
clusively that there "was no evidence that FHWA made any inde-
pendent evaluation whatever of the fisheries issues. "210 The court 
uncovered absolutely no proof that the FHW A had evaluated its 
decisions upon receiving the comments of other federal agencies; 
lacking that proof, the court could not find evidence of the federal 
review required by NEPA. Thus, while the district court was re-
versed on the scope of the EIS it ordered the Corps to prepare, the 
substance of its ruling was upheld: the circuit court found the federal 
review of the EIS by the FHWA to be insufficient and its use by 
the Corps to be improper. 
The Project drafters in Sierra Club were so intent on constructing 
Westway that they disregarded, and then even suppressed, relevant 
environmental information. The EIS was thus full of the self-serving 
statements that the court in Greene County, over a decade earlier, 
predicted states might make if allowed to prepare an EIS completely. 
In at least one case, then, the fears of the Greene County court were 
realized. 
Nevertheless, the holding in Sierra Club does not necessarily 
support a ban on state preparation of a final EIS. The case furthers 
considerably the attempt, begun in Iowa Citizens, to help courts 
evaluate the sufficiency of federal review of a state-prepared EIS. 
Sierra Club answers the question by pinpointing just how and when 
the federal agency and the state pre parer obtained their information; 
it also explores how federal officials considered and responded to the 
comments they received once they circulated a state-prepared EIS. 
207 [d. at 1382. 
208 Sierra Club, 701 F.2d at 1038--39. 
209 [d. at 1039. 
210 [d. at 1031. 
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In short, both the district and circuit courts in Sierra Club did not 
simply assert the sufficiency or insufficiency of federal review, and 
they did not simply accept evidence of meetings between federal and 
state officials as proof of the adequacy of federal review. Both courts 
supported their findings with the facts before them and were the 
first to explore how the requirement that the EIS be circulated for 
notice and comment could be used to test the sufficiency of federal 
review.211 Sierra Club, then, is a crucially important case in the law 
of EIS delegation, not because it devises a new standard of review 
- it does not - but because it is the very first case to apply existing 
standards in a meaningful way. 
Sierra Club is the only case to apply meaningfully the NEPA 
amendment since Congress decided that EIS preparation could be 
delegated, to the states, as long as independent federal evaluation 
followed. Yet it is not the only post-1975 advance in the judicial 
attempt to ensure that delegated EISs satisfy NEPA. Regulations 
now offer further guidance to courts seeking to detect bias and 
ensure that NEPA is satisfied. In 1978, the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality (CEQ) promulgated guidelines, now binding regulations, 
that attempt to describe agency responsibility, and require private 
contractors to file statements disavowing any interest in the project 
for which they prepare an EIS.212 
The potential of these regulations to guard against bias is great. 
Yet to date it has been realized only by two cases, perhaps because 
the regulations deal directly with federal agencies while their impact 
on state actions remains unclear. 
Sierra Club v. Sigler13 contains the fullest discussion yet of the 
CEQ regulations. It involved the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' 
issuance of permits needed to authorize the construction of a deep-
water port and crude oil distribution system.214 Confronting the 
Corps' reliance on an EIS prepared by a financially-interested party, 
the court noted that "an agency may not delegate its public duties 
to private entities, ... particularly private entities whose objectiv-
ity may be questioned on grounds of conflict of interest. "215_ Though 
the court had declared the private firm's role in the EIS to be 
"particularly troubling in this case because the consulting firm also 
211 Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1367, 1369-70 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), 701 F.2d 1011, 1021-22 (2d Cir. 1983). 
212 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (1983). 
213 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). 
214 [d. at 961-63. 
216 [d. at 963 n.3. 
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had a stake in the project which it was evaluating,"216 it refused to 
rule on whether or not the Corps had improperly rubberstamped 
the firm's EIS or even to decide if a violation of the CEQ regulations 
had occurred. 217 This court was not, however, shirking the question: 
as an appellate court, it was not asked to decide the question, and 
therefore could not. 218 
Regulations have not, however, uniformly constrained delegation. 
As early as 1974, the FHWA had promulgated regulations to satisfy 
NEPA's requirements but still allow consultants to prepare EISs as 
long as FHWA review followed. 219 These regulations even allowed 
financially-interested parties to prepare the EIS.220 Though these 
regulations were consistent with contemporary case law, NEPA's 
amendment raised the question of whether or not the regulations 
were valid insofar as they permitted EIS delegation to private par-
ties. Confronted with precisely this question, the court in Stop H-3 
Association v. Lewis221 concluded that: 
It appears from the legislative history of the 1975 amendment 
to NEPA (Public Law 94-83) that the section permitting dele-
gation of ErS preparation to State agencies was added to resolve 
the split in case law which had developed. The issue of consul-
tants was not addressed. It does not appear that Congress in-
tended to prohibit the delegation of ErS preparation to private 
consultants. r conclude that the regulation is neither contrary to 
NEPA nor invalid. 222 
The court then answered the plaintiff's alternative argument - that, 
even if the FHW A regulation was valid, it did not allow delegation 
to a private party. The Stop H-3 court found that the FHWA regu-
216 [d. 
217 [d. It appears that the appellate court undoubtedly would have applied the CEQ regu-
lation, supra note 212, to invalidate the delegation here, if the appellants had given it the 
opportunity. It is important to note this omission because Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 
(5th Cir. 1983), serves as a warning that the issue of EIS delegation to private parties is not 
resolved despite the number of cases upholding private preparation of the EIS. 
It is worth noting that the Sigler court cited Sierra Club v. Lynn in its argument against 
EIS delegation to private parties. See 695 F.2d at 963, n.3 (citing 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974)) 
and, supra note 99. 
218 Though the Sigler court invalidated the EIS on other grounds, it is important to note 
here that the failure to cite the CEQ regulation could have lost the case for the plaintiffs. 
The court in Sigler invalidated the final EIS because the statement did not consider envi-
ronmental costs in the manner prescribed by NEPA and the CEQ's worst-case analysis. See 
Sigler, 695 F.2d at 975-83. 
219 23 C.F.R. § 771. 7 (1980). 
220 Stop H-3 Association v. Lewis, 538 F.Supp. 149, 160 (D.C. Hawaii 1982). 
221 538 F.Supp. 149 (D.C. Hawaii 1982). 
222 [d. at 160-61. 
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lation did permit such delegation.223 The plaintiff's final defeat came 
when the court accepted evidence of contact between the federal 
agency and the private party as proof of federal review.224 That move 
led the court to rule that the consultant's financial interest in the 
highway need not be disclosed in the EIS they had prepared. "It is 
sufficient," the Stop H-3 court concluded, "that this interest was 
known to the agencies responsible for the EIS."225 The court did not 
address the obvious question as to how agencies that merely received 
the EIS for comment were to learn the circumstances of its prepa-
ration. 
In Stop H-3, the court's treatment of final EIS preparation would 
stop federal evaluation of a delegated EIS once the delegating 
agency receives the draft EIS back from the agencies it circulated 
the statement to for comment. This ruling demonstrates the failure 
of courts to appreciate what SieTra Club226 reveals about delegation. 
In limiting the disclosure of a statement's private preparation to the 
draft EIS circulated among agencies, the Stop H-3 court forces 
potential non-governmental environmental plaintiffs to rely on fed-
eral agencies to bring suit. In Sierra Club, the three federal agencies 
who initially fought the Corps' permit did not bring suit, despite 
knowledge of the inadequate evaluation that the privately-filed suit 
would later uncover.227 The refusal of federal agencies to intervene 
forced the Sierra Club to do so. 228 
The decision in Stop H -3 offers no assurance that plaintiffs outside 
of government will possess the insiders' knowledge that the Sierra 
Club drew upon in its decision to file suit. In short, if courts follow 
Stop H -3, not all potential plaintiffs will learn of the possible bias 
that may affect them in a privately-prepared EIS. Yet Sierra Club 
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers demonstrates that suits 
by private plaintiffs may be necessary if NEPA's requirement that 
delegated statements receive independent federal evaluation is to 
be satisfied. 
B. The Delegation of NEPA 
The entire question of EIS delegation hinges upon which respon-
sibilities NEPA imposes on the federal agency once that agency has 
223 [d. at 161. 
224 [d. 
225 [d. 
226 701 F.2d at 1024. 
227 [d. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text. 
228 [d. 
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delegated to a state the task of EIS preparation. Yet Congress has 
not simply allowed the delegation of EIS preparation to the states 
as long as federal review follows.229 Once the task of EIS preparation 
is delegated to a private party, some federal statutes free parts of 
the federal bureaucracy from following NEPA.230 
The second kind of delegation discussed in post-1975 case law 
represents the type of federal law recodification that Senator Jackson 
opposed and Representative Aspinall endorsed. This delegation and 
its effects must be discussed here to explain cases where the results 
are incompatible with NEPA, even though the courts purport to 
satisfy the statute. 
One year before amending NEPA, in legislation that apparently 
prompted little debate and received no mention in the Senate Report 
on NEPA's amendment, Congress passed the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974.231 In Monarch Chemical Works v. 
Exon,232 the City of Omaha sought Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) funding that was made available under 
the Act for an industrial redevelopment project.233 The court re-
viewed an EIS prepared by the city after it had been delegated the 
authority by HUD.234 This delegation was statutory delegation out-
side of NEPA, a delegation in which the federal court reviews actions 
taken by state or municipal, not federal government. The two pre-
mier cases of such reviews are Monarch Chemical235 and Brandon 
v. Pierce. 236 
The Federal Housing and Community Development Act, enacted 
in 1974 and amended in 1977, allows federal EIS delegation "to 
applicants who assume all of the responsibilities for environmental 
review, decisionmaking, and action pursuant to such Act that would 
apply to the Secretary [of HUD] were he to undertake such projects 
229 In legislation with effects beyond the scope of the EIS delegation discussed in this article, 
Congress has allowed federal agencies to delegate all of the agency's NEPA responsibilities 
to a private party. 
= See Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Thone, 604 F.2d at 1085 n.2 (8th Cir. 1979) for an 
example. 
231 Federal Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, § 101 et seq., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5301 et seq. (1982). 
232 Monarch Chemical Works v. Exon, 452 F. Supp. 493 (D. Neb. 1978), preliminary injunc-
tion lifted, 466 F. Supp. 639 (D. Neb. 1979), a/I'd sub nom. Monarch Chemical Works v. 
Thone, 604 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1979). 
238 Monarch Chemical, supra note 232, at 1085. 
234 Id. 
236 See supra note 232. 
236 725 F.2d 555 (lOth Cir. 1984). 
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as Federal projects."237 As long as the recipient of federal funds 
assumes the liabilities the federal agency might otherwise have ,238 
the delegation of EIS preparation is proper. Embracing such a com-
plete transfer of responsibility - a transfer even the amended 
NEPA does not envision - the regulations HUD promulgated under 
the Housing and Community Development Act allowed the delega-
tion of EIS preparation to a private party "regardless of the appli-
cant's technical expertise. "239 
Under the Housing and Community Development Act, the Mon-
arch Chemical court decided that "HUD is never required to receive 
a copy of an impact statement prior to a release of funds. "240 Al-
though this conclusion represented a complete circumvention of 
NEPA, the court noted only that: "In contrast with the 1975 amend-
ment to the National Policy [sic] Act itself, found at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 4332(2)(D)(1977), HUD has the power to delegate environmental 
duties ... while relinquishing all responsibility for the conse-
quences. "241 
The acknowledgment of HUD's complete circumvention of NEPA 
did not lead the Monarch Chemical court to a defense of the statute. 
Beyond this single statement, it refrained from any further comment 
on the recodification of federal law that allowed the circumvention. 
On appeal, the plaintiffs dropped all arguments of invalid delegation, 
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 242 
The reluctance of the Monarch Chemical court to address the 
circumvention of NEPA through recodification continues. In another, 
more recent case, Brandon v. Pierce,243 the court upheld a result 
that is hard to reconcile with NEPA's aim of ensuring that govern-
ment consider the environmental consequences of its actions. In 
Brandon, the court confronted a private firm's preparation of an 
"Environmental Assessment" done under the Federal Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, as part of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development's complete delegation of its NEPA 
responsibilities to the City of Stilwell, Oklahoma.244 In Brandon, the 
delegation of the Environmental Assessment to a private engineer-
237 Monarch Chemical, 466 F. Supp. at 645 (quoting, in part, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(I) (1977». 
2S8 [d. 
239 [d. at 646. 
240 [d. 
241 [d. 
242 See supra note 232. 
243 Brandon, supra note 237, at 557-58. 
244 [d. at 563-64. 
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ing firm occurred under a contract that specified the firm would be 
paid only if the project for which it was preparing the Assessment 
was approved.245 Despite this contingent payment, and the tempta-
tion for self-serving statements of the kind the Greene County court 
had condemned, the Brandon court upheld the delegation of the 
Assessment, treating it as an EIS: 
It is true that the firm had not received compensation for their 
services on the Environmental Assessment, and such work was 
treated as part of the overall engineering services, ... which 
could arguably be said to have influenced their work. However, 
it was the City, not the engineering firm, which had the respon-
sibility of making the negative finding on an EIS and this re-
sponsibility was carried out by the City. 246 
In short, simply because the City had retained the right to refuse 
the EIS, its delegation of the statement was proper. The City's 
imposition of conditions that virtually guaranteed biased preparation 
was not even questioned by the court. 
The requirement for independent federal evaluation found in the 
amendment to NEPA, unaided by any requirement that the EIS 
record display such evaluation, becomes in Brandon a hollow for-
mality. Though the CEQ Council during the Carter Administration 
disapproved HUD environmental review procedures - procedures 
the Brandons claimed were "an unlawful delegation of duties"247 -
during the early years of the Reagan Administration the CEQ Coun-
cil reversed its position and approved the HUD regulations.248 The 
congressional approach to delegation has similarly broadened dele-
gatory powers: in 1979, Congress specifically amended the Federal 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 to broaden 
HUD's delegation authority.249 Faced with statutory and regulatory 
approval of standards that directly contradict the NEP A amend-
ment, the Brandon court ruled that the Federal Housing and Com-
munity Development Act "makes [it] clear that Congress intended 
to transfer NEPA responsibilities from the federal agency to the 
local grant applicants. "250 
The increasing delegation of environmental responsibilities to 
areas outside NEP A's reach, and the failure of the NEPA amend-
245 [d. at 564. 
246 [d. 
247 [d. at 559. 
248 [d. at 560-61 n.3. 
249 [d. at 560 n.2. 
250 [d. at 560. 
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ment to codify workable standards for judicial review of EIS dele-
gation under NEPA, have combined to create a situation that returns 
the delegation question - for certain projects, at least - to the 
early 1970s. Now, any litigant challenging an EIS delegation must 
ensure that the federal statute under which the questioned agency 
claims to act does not sanction a wholesale delegation of NEPA 
responsibilities. No court to date has struck down the validity of 
such a delegation. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROPER EIS DELEGATION 
The current law of delegation reflects a multitude of contradic-
tions. Though CEQ regulations ban conflicts of interest,251 payment 
for a privately-prepared EIS is allowed to be contingent upon ap-
proval of the very project for which the E IS is prepared.252 Despite 
congressional statements urging delegation to competent person-
nel,253 and despite federal254 and state255 protests that they lack the 
staff competent to prepare EISs, no delegation statute or regulation 
conditions delegation on a federal determination that the state or 
private party possess resources sufficient to prepare the EIS. Reg-
ulation has not sought to specify the number or sorts of personnel 
needed to prepare the statement. The degree to which states may 
delegate EIS preparation to either private parties or to "adminis-
trative entities" remains unaddressed. 
Against this background, the following recommendations encom-
pass both statutory and regulatory changes aimed at reducing bias 
and ensuring adequate independent federal evaluation. Adoption of 
these changes would clarify the judicial evaluation of EIS delegation 
by providing to courts sufficient standards for detecting the abuses 
of delegation seen in Sierra Club. 256 
1. Ban Private Preparation of the EIS 
The general mandate NEPA imposes on the federal bureaucracy 
implicitly assumes that, despite their varied missions, federal agen-
cies retain the objectivity needed to make a good-faith consideration 
of environmental concerns. If federal agencies may be presumed to 
261 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 127. 
256 541 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), partially a/I'd, partially vacated, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d 
Cir. 1983). 
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be capable of such evaluation, it does seem hypocritical to conclude, 
as did the court in Conservation Society, that states are incapable 
of preparing an EIS objectively because their agencies also face 
legislative mandates.257 State preparation of an EIS cannot be pre-
sumed biased without also presuming that the aims of NEP A are 
impossible to meet. Federal agencies clearly possess mandates just 
as imperative as those of the states. With both federal and state 
agencies, NEPA is now a statute that imposes a mandate of envi-
ronmental concern on agencies in addition to the regulatory mandate 
that created the agency. 
The same rationale cannot be applied to the private preparation 
of an EIS under NEPA. The delegation of EIS preparation to private 
parties divides responsibility for an EIS along fundamentally differ-
ent lines than does federal-state delegation. Where the latter simply 
divides delegation between different governments, the former di-
vides delegation between the public and private sectors. This divi-
sion leaves courts powerless under NEP A to affect the conduct of 
private parties: NEPA is a statute designed to ensure that govern-
ment, not the private sector, is 'properly concerned for the environ-
ment. 
Failure to remember that NEPA places responsibilities on gov-
ernment leads to cases, like Brandon,258 which pervert the entire 
purpose of the statute. Allowing the government to "satisfy" NEP A 
by contractually making payment for a delegated EIS contingent on 
approving the very project for which the statement is prepared 
misses the point of the statute. At the very least, courts ought to 
refuse, as a matter of law, to allow such contractual conditions to 
attach to the delegation of an EIS. Courts that permit an agency to 
delegate an EIS under conditions that assure bias, have not consid-
ered NEPA to be anything more than an environmental protection 
statute. However vague the statute is - and experience has shown 
the statute to be an unusually vague one - NEPA at least specifies 
whose conduct the courts must examine. It points to the govern-
ment. In light of this mandate, there is no valid role for private EIS 
preparation. NEPA should be amended to ban the delegation of EIS 
preparation to private parties. 
2. Regulate the Preparation of EISs by Local Agencies 
NEPA's amendment provides that it "does not affect the legal 
sufficiency of statements prepared by State agencies with less than 
267 See supra notes 109, 115-16 and accompanying text. 
268 725 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1984). 
122 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:79 
statewide jurisdiction. "259 The amendment does not, however, out-
line any standards for judicial decision about the legal sufficiency of 
such statements. The creation of a local agency, such as the Project 
in Sierra Club,260 demonstrates the need for states to remain flexible 
in creating administrative entities to handle the jobs encountered in 
complying with federal grants. Yet the conduct of agencies like the 
Project261 demonstrates the need to police such agencies. If the job 
of EIS preparation is not to be endlessly delegated and passed 
throughout the private sector, limits must be placed on the way in 
which local agencies prepare the EIS. 
The CEQ should promulgate regulations forbidding the use of 
private parties by local agencies preparing the EIS. In effect, states 
ought not to be allowed to satisfy NEPA by creating "administrative 
entities" that are actually groups of private consultants. NEPA de-
mands adequate governmental consideration of environmental im-
pact, and, if private EIS preparation is incompatible with NEPA, 
government should not aggravate the problem of private preparation 
by creating quasi-public entities such as the Project. 
3. Require Greater Documentation of Federal Evaluation of 
Delegated EISs 
Existing CEQ regulations offer the courts standards against which 
to judge the sufficiency of federal review through the use of the note 
and comment process.262 The CEQ requires the federal agency filing 
the EIS to state why it did not follow suggestions received from 
other federal agencies following circulation of a draft. This regulation 
could be used to protect against the failure of the filing agency to 
evaluate state-prepared EISs. Courts apparently have not realized 
this potential. Even in Sierra Club, a case in which the commenting 
agency noticed and protested an environmental impact the filing 
agency was ignoring,263 this regulation was not cited. When courts 
have cited this particular CEQ regulation,264 they have done so in 
connection with private claims that the federal agency did not 
properly consider alternatives in the final EIS. The regulation has 
269 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1982). 
260 See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text. 
262 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (1984). 
268 See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. 
264 Friends of the River v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 720 F.2d 93, 120 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983); Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 437 n.9 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
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not yet been used to ensure that the federal agency filing an EIS 
consider every suggestion raised by agencies commenting on the 
draft. This use of the regulation would accomplish NEPA's aim of 
ensuring adequate federal evaluation of environmental impact. 
The CEQ should promulgate regulations requiring more detailed 
documentation of federal guidance when state officials prepare a 
delegated EIS. Federal agencies delegating EIS preparation to the 
states should be required to keep a complete record of every discus-
sion between the agency and the state concerning the statement. 
This record should indicate what was discussed with the state on 
any given date. States should be required to keep a similar record, 
and the federal and state records should be kept independently, 
without comparison of their contents. It was the comparison of the 
federal agency record with the state's record in Sierra Club265 that 
helped to uncover the suppression of environmental impact against 
which delegation must protect. 
Finally, courts should use the Code of Federal Regulations, at 
volume 40, section 1502.17, to ensure that the reader of a delegated 
EIS knows precisely who prepared it. Though the Stop H-3266 court's 
decision that a final EIS need not list the name of a private contrib-
utor seems to violate the regulation, it is important to note that the 
regulation currently requires only the names of the persons "pri-
marily responsible for preparing the EIS."267 Lest courts begin to 
gauge the significance of anyone contributor to the EIS, it is pref-
erable to drop the "primarily" requirement from the regulation, and 
to list everyone involved in the statement's preparation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
NEP A was drafted to ensure that the federal government consider 
the environmental impact of its actions. Courts initially disagreed 
over the extent of federal EIS preparation needed to satisfy NEPA, 
but since NEPA's passage, there has been general agreement that 
the task of EIS preparation may be divided between state and 
federal government. Disagreement over how to divide the federal 
and state roles in satisfying the EIS requirement ended in 1975, 
when Congress amended NEPA to allow complete state preparation 
of an EIS so long as it is followed by independent federal evaluation. 
265 See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. 
266 Stop H-3 Association v. Lewis, 538 F. Supp. 149 (D. Hawaii 1982). 
267 40 C.F.R. § 1502.17 (1985). 
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Thus while the law was changed to permit delegation, Congress did 
not provide the courts with additional standards for policing it. 
As a result, courts have continued to confront the question of the 
sufficiency of federal evaluation. The resulting confusion has allowed 
what may be improper delegation. To ensure proper delegation, and 
to ensure judicial detection of improper delegation, it is necessary 
for the courts to enforce the CEQ regulations. When courts consider 
these regulations, as well as further CEQ regulations, then there 
will be clearer standards for determining the sufficiency of federal 
review. Passage of NEP A's 1975 amendment did not resolve the 
questions raised by delegation. In the legislative arena, much re-
mains to be done, and in the future, the problem promises to grow 
more pressing. 
However weakened NEPA may be by confused EIS delegation 
standards and the statutory circumvention of its aims, the issues 
raised by the delegation of the responsibilities it imposes on the 
federal government extend beyond the statute and beyond environ-
mental law. The ability of the courts to enforce the law is related to 
their ability to supervise delegation. As the judicial treatment of 
EIS delegation demonstrates, when courts are left without stan-
dards, they are all too often left to assert, rather than to demon-
strate, the validity of their findings. The responsibilities of the courts 
- as well as those of Congress - go unmet while the federal 
bureaucracy carries out the very tasks the courts and Congress are 
supposed to supervise. A recent D.C. Circuit case,268 one involving 
neither NEP A nor the environment, addressed the future of this 
issue: 
As attention to this area of our law grows, it refocuses thought 
on one of the rationales against excessive delegation: the harm 
done thereby to principles of political accountability. Such harm 
is doubled in degree in the context of a transfer of authority 
from Congress to an agency and then from agency to private 
individuals. The vitality of challenges to the former type of trans-
fer is suspect, but to the latter, unquestionable. 269 
On this continued vitality more than merely the survival of NEP A 
may depend. 
268 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. F.C.C., 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) cert. denied, -U.S. _, 105 S. Ct. 1224 (1985). 
269 [d. at 1143 nAl. 
